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6 The Third Meditation: causal
arguments for God’s existence
introduct ion
It is often thought that Descartes’ epistemic project in theMeditations
falls apart in the Third Meditation. Although some readers recoil at
the method of universal doubt, which is the hallmark of the First
Meditation, if one is a foundationalist about knowledge, it is at least
plausible to begin from a clean slate by doubting all of one’s former
beliefs. Assuming one approves of Descartes’method, one also ﬁnds
the main insights of the Second Meditation to be compelling.
I cannot doubt that I exist, nor that I am a thinking thing. But readers
report that after that concession their reserves of charity run dry. By
the end of the Third Meditation no one remains on board with
Descartes’ project. The problem lies with his efforts to prove God’s
existence by invoking scholastic and Platonic principles. In the
Third Meditation, he famously presents two causal (or cosmologi-
cal) arguments that rely on antiquated doctrines about degrees of
reality and different kinds of being, and bizarre principles of causal-
ity – none of which seem “evident by the natural light.” Descartes
claims to be leaving the past behind, to be an innovator using only
the resources of his own mind to determine what can be discovered
about the nature of reality, but what he presents in the Third
Meditation leaves a startlingly different impression. Ironically, his
arguments failed to convince even those readers sympathetic with
scholasticism, such as Johannes Caterus, who expresses deep reser-
vations in the First Objections (AT 7: 92–95). If Descartes’ argu-
ments fell ﬂat with his contemporaries, they are received with even
greater aversion today. One inﬂuential philosopher has quipped that
the causal proofs appear to have come from Mars!1
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Given this reception, trying to change readers’ perceptions of the
causal arguments is a tall order, but that is exactly what I hope to do
in this chapter. In the next section, I begin by reconstructing a sim-
pliﬁed version of the ﬁrst causal argument. The aim of this recon-
struction is to show that – at its core – Descartes’ proof is simple,
elegant, and fairly plausible, at least as compared to other arguments
of its kind. The core argument eludesmost of the objections that have
been leveled against the more complex, “scholastic” version, but it
also raises an important interpretive question: why does Descartes
present the latter if he has the resources for a simpler and less con-
tentious demonstration? On pages 000–00, I attempt to answer this
question. On pages 000–00, I take up the second causal argument in
order to show that it too can be formulated in simple terms. I also
explain the sense in which the arguments are “reducible to one” and
how God can be the cause of himself.
the f ir st causal argument
The “core” argument
A simpliﬁed version of Descartes’ ﬁrst causal argument can be for-
mulated as follows:
(1) I have an idea that represents an actually inﬁnite being hav-
ing all perfections.
(2) Everything that exists has a cause of its existence.
(3) The only possible cause of this idea is an actually inﬁnite
being.
(4) Therefore, an actually inﬁnite being exists.2
To determine whether this core argument succeeds, let us take each
of the premises in turn. Like all causal arguments, Descartes’ ﬁrst
effort starts from some known effect and then posits God as its only
possible cause. Traditional cosmological arguments, such as those
found among Aquinas’ Five Ways, often take as their premise the
existence of the universe or something else known through the
senses. But the epistemic status of Descartes’ meditator is highly
constrained. At the beginning of the ThirdMeditation, the hyperbolic
doubts of the First Meditation have not been discharged and if the
reader is meditating faithfully he must not afﬁrm anything that
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admits of even the slightest doubt. Among other things, he is doubt-
ing the existence of physical objects and treating the reports of his
senses as if they were false.3 However, in the Second Meditation he
discovered that he exists and is a thinking thing. He can be certain of
these two propositions at least as long as he is attending to them. As a
thinking thing, the meditator can also be certain that he has ideas,
among them the idea of God. The objects of his ideas are subject to
doubt, but the meditator cannot doubt that he has these ideas or that
they have the content that they do. The immediate deliverances of
consciousness are indubitable. Thus, Descartes’ ﬁrst causal argu-
ment starts from the meditator’s idea of God and the second from
his existence as a thinking thing, which possesses that idea.
Early in the Third Meditation Descartes attempts to classify his
ideas based on their causal origin into three mutually exclusive and
jointly exhaustive categories: innate, adventitious, and invented.
The hope is that this taxonomy might enable him to determine
whether anything exists outside him, but Descartes acknowledges
very quickly that he does not yet have a means for classifying his
ideas into one category or other. This effort may seem like a false
start, but in fact it helps direct the meditator’s attention to an impor-
tant distinction that is crucial to both causal arguments, namely, the
one between innate and invented ideas, the latter being ideas for
which the meditator is causally responsible. The ﬁrst causal argu-
ment is as much a proof that the idea of God is innate as it is a
demonstration of God’s existence. We infer that God exists as the
cause of our idea of him – “the mark of the craftsman stamped on his
work” (AT 7: 51). The argument also hinges on the claim that the idea
of God is unique. The meditator can be the cause of his ideas of all
other things, such as those of other people, animals, angels, and of
course ﬁctitious beings. This is not to say the meditator is the cause
of all those ideas. On the contrary, Descartes ultimately afﬁrms that
the idea of oneself as a thinking thing is also innate. But since the
ideas of all things other than God are of ﬁnite substances, and the
meditator is a ﬁnite substance, he could be their cause. What is
special about the idea of God, according to Descartes, is that it
represents an actually inﬁnite being.4 His strategy is to argue that
because this idea represents something actually inﬁnite, and because
it is unique in this regard, the meditator cannot be its cause. The
meditator forms new ideas by drawing upon other ideas at his
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disposal, but since the idea of God is unique, there is no other idea
upon which to draw.
Descartes’ ﬁrst premise is a powerful one, which it must be since
he aims to prove both that God exists and that he has all of the
perfections that Christian theologians have traditionally assigned to
him. Descartes takes that to be one of the advantages of his causal
argument over previous versions, which fail to deliver on the divine
nature.5 I am not going to argue that this premise is unassailable,
only that one can appreciate why he thinks he is entitled to it given
the nature of his project and given what the meditator has discov-
ered so far. Contemporary readers often object to the version of the
proof that he presents in the ThirdMeditation on the grounds that it
is too scholastic. But there is nothing especially scholastic about the
ﬁrst premise. In fact, it deviates from at least one important tradi-
tion among medieval philosophers of denying that we can have
positive knowledge of God’s essence.6 We can know God only neg-
atively (Pseudo-Dionysius et al.), as the cause of creaturely attrib-
utes (Maimonides), or by analogy (Aquinas). Contrary to these
philosophers, Descartes afﬁrms that we can have a clear and distinct
idea of God’s essence.
Given thismedieval tradition, Descartes anticipates that some read-
ers will object to the claim that we, with our ﬁnite intellects, can
understand an actually inﬁnite being. To respond, he draws a distinc-
tion between knowing and grasping: I can know that God is inﬁnite
even though I do not grasp all of his properties nor fully understand
what itmeans to be inﬁnite.7A deeper objection would be to deny that
one even has an idea of God, or at least the idea thatDescartes purports
to have. This is the tack taken by some of his contemporaries, such as
Hobbes, though his version of the objection assumes that ideas are
corporeal images – a claim thatDescartes vehemently rejects.8Amore
charitable critic might grant that ideas are modiﬁcations of the mind,
regarded as a thinking, non-corporeal thing, but still object that we do
not have one that represents an actually inﬁnite being. Descartes
acknowledges that, if true, this criticism would be devastating:
But if no such idea is to be found in me, I shall have no argument to convince
me of the existence of anything apart frommyself. For despite a most careful
and comprehensive survey, this is the only argument I have so far been able to
ﬁnd. (Third Meditation, AT 7: 42)
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Both versions of the causal argument – and, for that matter, the onto-
logical argument of the FifthMeditation – depend on the claim thatwe
have an idea of God. In some contexts, especially when responding to
critics, Descartes takes it as obvious that we have such an idea and
accuses those who deny it of being lazy, stubborn, and/or weak-
minded.9 Anyone who uses the word “God” in a sentence and under-
stands what they are saying has an idea of such a being.10 But in other
contexts, Descartes allows that even readers who are meditating faith-
fully may have trouble discovering their innate idea of God. Indeed, he
tells one of his correspondents that some readersmay not discover this
idea even after reading theMeditations a thousand times.11 Descartes
has a philosophical explanation for this, but we must look outside the
Meditations proper to ﬁnd it.
It is sometimes said that Descartes has a dispositional theory of
innate ideas: to say that an idea is innate does not entail that it is
always consciously present. Rather, “we simply mean that we have
within ourselves the faculty of summoning up the idea” (AT 7:189).12
Descartes maintains that our innate ideas often need to be triggered
or “awakened,” to use the Platonic language that he sometimes
encourages.13 In other places, he suggests that our inability to per-
ceive one of our ideas is the result of philosophical prejudice ingrained
by habit, especially the tendency to conceive of things using sensory
images.14 He recognizes, therefore, that it is incumbent upon him to
play role of the Socratic midwife, massaging the intellect of his
meditator in order to dispel these prejudices and induce the proper
ideas. Some commentators hold that Descartes must argue for the
claim that we have an idea of God, but this denies his commitment to
the doctrine of innate ideas. If the idea of God is innate, Descartes’
task is simply to help the meditator become aware of it, so that she
can discover its contents.15
In the Third Meditation, Descartes attempts to do this by address-
ing a potential objection to the ﬁrst causal argument. A meditator
might suspect that he could form the idea of an actually inﬁnite being
by negating the idea of himself as ﬁnite. If that were true, then there
would be no need to posit God as the cause of the former. But
Descartes wants the meditator to notice that the idea of God as
actually inﬁnite is prior to the perception of the ﬁnite. “For how
could I understand that I doubted or desired – that is, lacked some-
thing – and that I was not wholly perfect, unless there were in me
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some idea of a more perfect being which enabled me to recognize my
own defects by comparison?” (AT 7: 45–46). In Fifth Replies, he puts
the point somewhat differently: we do not form an idea of the inﬁnite
by negating the ﬁnite; on the contrary, we conceive of the ﬁnite by
limiting the inﬁnite, for “all limitation implies a negation of the
inﬁnite” (AT 7: 365). One might be tempted to read Descartes as
saying that we conceive of the ﬁnite through the inﬁnite, but that
would put him very close to Spinoza and encourage the suggestion
that there is only one substance, which he abhors. It would alsomake
the idea ofGod temporally prior to, or at least contemporaneouswith,
the idea of oneself as ﬁnite, but in the Meditations the latter is
discovered ﬁrst. Descartes’ claim is the more minimal one that the
idea of oneself naturally recalls the idea of God. The idea of myself as
ﬁnite, imperfect, and dependent triggers the idea of something inﬁn-
ite, perfect, and independent. As we shall see below, this is not
Descartes’ only means for awakening the meditator’s idea of God,
but it is the main one. Its success depends of course on whether we
have the innate idea Descartes says we have.
(2) Everything that exists has a cause of its existence.
The second premise of the argument is a statement of the general
causal principle, ex nihilo, nihil ﬁt, which has a long pedigree in
philosophy.16 Unlike the other causal principles employed in the
Third Meditation, the ex nihilo principle does not make any assump-
tions about degrees of reality or different kinds of being. For that
reason, it does not state that everything has a sufﬁcient cause, only
that it has some cause. Every major early modern rationalist (and
even some empiricists like Locke) accepts this general principle, as
does Aristotle and his scholastic followers. So from the perspective
of these traditions at least, this second premise is unobjectionable.17
Descartes is also not violating the strictures of his own method of
doubt, for the meditator has already discovered that there are some
very simple and self-evident truths – such as the fact that he exists,
3+ 2= 5, etc. –which cannot be doubtedwhile one is presently attend-
ing to them. Descartes takes the ex nihilo principle to be among these
truths.
(3) The only possible cause of this idea is an actually inﬁnite
being.
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For the purpose of appreciating the simplicity of the core argument,
this premise is key. As noted above, Descartes asks the meditator to
take stock of his ideas and to notice an important difference between
the idea of God and the ideas of allﬁnite substances, namely, he could
be the cause of the latter. These other ideas can be constructed by
borrowing elements from the idea he has of himself or, in the case of
ideas of angels, by borrowing elements from the idea of himself and
the idea of God, since the idea of an angel represents a substancemore
perfect than himself but less perfect than God.18 Later in the Third
Meditation, Descartes recognizes that even the clear and distinct
elements in his ideas of corporeal things, such as extension, shape,
position, and motion, could be derived from the idea he has of him-
self. These elements are not part of that idea of a thinking thing, but
since they are merely modes of a ﬁnite substance and he is a ﬁnite
substance, he could be their cause (AT 7: 45).
In drawing our attention to this contrast between the idea of God
and the ideas of all other things, Descartes is appealing to an intuitive
account of how invented ideas are formed: one takes other ideas – or
their elements – and combines them in novel ways.19 Of course, an
empiricist might object that the idea of God is formed in the same
way.20 Descartes attempts to block this objection by prompting the
meditator’s awareness that the idea of an actually inﬁnite being is
unique. If that is right, then the meditator could not have borrowed
the content of this idea from any other source, and thus the idea could
only come from something outside of him! This is why Descartes
reserves the term “inﬁnite” for God, and applies the term ‘indeﬁnite’
to the divisions of matter, the vastness of the extended universe, and
other things that we might be inclined to call “inﬁnite.”21 Still, even
if the idea of God is singular in this way, one might envisage another
way to construct it using only the resources of one’s own mind.22
I might notice that I, like the supremely perfect being depicted in my
idea, am a thinking thing. My knowledge is ﬁnite and imperfect by
comparison, but it seems to increase gradually. Perhaps it could be
increased to inﬁnity, at least conceptually. So what is the meditator
supposedly doing? He is taking an element in his idea of himself as a
ﬁnite being, such as knowledge or power, and augmenting or enlarg-
ing it. To construct an idea of God by this means, one would have to
follow the same procedure for each of the perfections that is ﬁnitely
instantiated in oneself – power, goodness, duration, etc. – and then
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compound the products of that process. But Descartes wants the
meditator to discern that the ﬁrst task is impossible. The idea of
divine knowledge is of something actually inﬁnite, that is, a com-
pleted inﬁnity. But the idea produced by augmenting the idea of ﬁnite
knowledge would be only of a potential inﬁnity. One cannot form an
idea of actual inﬁnity by endlessly augmenting the idea of something
ﬁnite, any more than one can produce an inﬁnite number by end-
lessly adding ﬁnite numbers.23 Speaking in the Third Meditation of
this proposed method for constructing an idea of God, Descartes
writes:
But all this is impossible. First, though it is true that there is a gradual
increase in my knowledge, and that I have many potentialities which are
not yet actual, this is all quite irrelevant to the idea of God, which contains
absolutely nothing that is potential; indeed, this gradual increase in knowl-
edge is itself the surest sign of imperfection. What is more, even if my knowl-
edge always increases more and more, I recognize that it will never actually
be inﬁnite, since it will never reach the point where it is not capable of a
further increase; God, on the other hand, I take to be actually inﬁnite, so that
nothing can be added to his perfection. (AT 7: 47)
It will not help to object, as some of Descartes’ contemporaries do,
that one might have derived the idea of God from one’s family or
associates, reading books, etc., for this only pushes the problem back
a step. Descartes can extrapolate from his own case that no ﬁnite
being could form the idea of actually inﬁnite knowledge or omnis-
cience, etc., by augmenting the ideas of ﬁnite attributes.24 Earlier we
noted that Descartes takes the idea of God to be conceptually prior to
the idea the meditator has of himself. One might add that the idea of
actual inﬁnity is also prior to the idea of potential inﬁnity. One sees
that the product formed by endlessly augmenting the idea of ﬁnite
knowledge is incomplete only because one has a prior idea of the
completed inﬁnity that is God.25 In addition to showingwhy he could
not be the cause of his idea of God, this exercise illustrates again that
the meditator has such an idea, thus bolstering Descartes’ efforts to
motivate the ﬁrst premise of the argument.26
Apart from the conclusion, which follows validly from the prem-
ises, this completes the simple version of the causal argument. To
summarize brieﬂy in a way that emphasizes its strength, the argu-
ment depends on one’s having attained an idea of God as actually
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inﬁnite, a very general and intuitively plausible causal principle, and
a simple cognitive exercise that shows that one could not be the cause
of said idea. Again, there is no appeal to bizarre principles of causality
or to antiquated doctrines about degrees of reality and different types
of being. To be sure, the theistic proof that Descartes presents in the
Third Meditation relies on such principles and doctrines, but the
point of this reconstruction has been to demonstrate that he does
not need them. He has the resources for a more compelling argument
that puts his scholastic predecessors to shame, both for its simplicity
and because it delivers on the nature ofGod in away that they cannot.
The Scholastic Version of the Argument
The simpliﬁed version of the ﬁrst causal argument is unlikely to
persuademost readers today, but it is clearly superior to the elaborate,
scholastic version that Descartes presents in the Third Meditation.
Sowhy then does he present the latter? One general suggestion is that
cosmological arguments were the stock and trade of scholasticism
and Descartes saw himself as writing for an audience steeped in that
tradition, and so employs principles and doctrines that strike us as
wildly improbable but which he could reasonably expect would res-
onate with his seventeenth-century readers. This is certainly part of
the story, but there is a deeper explanation.
In the previous section, I noted that Descartes maintains that phil-
osophical prejudices – formed in childhood and ingrained by long
habit – constitute one of themain obstacles to discovering one’s innate
idea of God as an actually inﬁnite being.27 As he reveals in the Second
Replies, the philosophical prejudices in question pertain to the habit of
conceiving of everything in corporeal terms, including immaterial
beings such as the soul and God. If one is regarding God as a corporeal
being, then one is thinking of him as ﬁnite and corruptible rather
than as inﬁnite and supremely perfect, as required by the causal argu-
ments.28 The controversial doctrines that Descartes marshals in order
to formulate the ﬁrst causal argument are designed to dispel these
prejudices or, short of that, to exploit them in such a way that the
meditator will nevertheless be persuaded that God exists.
Let us turn now to some of these doctrines that readers have found
so puzzling. I will not attempt to formulate themore complex version
of the ﬁrst causal argument, which has been treated at length by
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others. Instead, I will focus on explaining how these doctrines of
old are designed to dislodge prejudice, exploit the meditator’s ten-
dency to conceive of everything in corporeal or sensory terms, and
induce his innate idea of God. Where possible, I will also indicate
how, in Descartes’ hands, these doctrines are more innocuous than
they seem.
Perhaps the most important bit of metaphysical machinery that
Descartes invokes is that being is scaled or admits of degrees. This
doctrine is sometimes known as “the great chain of being” and has its
roots in Plato and Aristotle’s philosophies. Medieval proponents of
this doctrine countenanced a continuous scale of being from inani-
mate objects all the way up to God, with plants, animals, humans,
and angels falling in between. These days, philosophers have little
sympathy for the claim that reality is scaled. One tends to regard
existence in simpler terms: either something exists or it does not.
Descartes’ view is closer to ours than it might seem, for his version of
the scale contains only three distinct levels. From greatest to least,
they are 1) God or inﬁnite substance, 2) ﬁnite substances (i.e., created
minds and bodies), and 3) modes. This shows that Descartes is not
simply taking over doctrines from the scholastics but adapting them
for his own purposes and, in this case, conforming them to his
substance-mode ontology. He enlists the traditional hierarchy –
which plays no other role in his philosophy –merely as an instrument
for achieving three speciﬁc goals relating to the causal arguments.
First, it highlights that the proper conception of God involves regard-
ing him as actually inﬁnite. As noted above, the natural tendency to
conceive of everything in corporeal terms makes it difﬁcult to regard
him in this way. Using terms that he believes the meditator accepts,
Descartes illustrates that corporeal beings occupy amuch lower place
in the conceptual order than God does. Second, the ﬁrst causal argu-
ment hinges on the claim that the idea of an actually inﬁnite being is
unique, a point that is reﬂected in the structure of the scale. In fact,
because his scale is discontinuous he is able to stress that God is sui
generis.
Third, the scale of being underscores Descartes’ strategy of argu-
ment. Notice that on his three-point division, degrees of reality are a
function of differences in ontological independence.29God or inﬁnite
substance occupies the highest end of the scale (i.e., is said to have the
greatest degree of reality) because he does not depend on anything for
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his existence. Finite substances are one step lower because they do
not depend on anything except God for their existence, and modes –
because they depend in turn on ﬁnite substances – constitute the
lowest end of the scale. As Descartes writes, “a substance is more of a
thing than a mode . . . and . . . if there is an inﬁnite and independent
substance, it is more of a thing than a ﬁnite and dependent sub-
stance” (Third Replies, AT 7:185, emphasis added). The salient con-
trast is between ﬁnite and inﬁnite substance. The relevance of this
contrast to Descartes’ strategy is clearest in the second causal argu-
ment, where I am supposed to observe that as a ﬁnite being, I depend
for my existence on something else and therefore could not be the
cause of myself. Moreover, my ultimate cause must be something
that is ontologically independent. Commentators sometimes com-
plain that modes depend on ﬁnite substances in a different way than
the latter depend on God, thus upsetting the symmetry of the scale.30
Granted, but that only shows that from within Descartes’ strict
metaphysics the scale of being is an artiﬁcial construct; again, he is
using it in the context of the causal arguments merely as a means to
an end.
Another claim that readers of the Third Meditation often ﬁnd
perplexing is that ideas enjoy two types of being, formal and objective.
These terms and the distinction itself are owed to scholasticism, as
Descartes acknowledges in the French edition of the Meditations,
where he speaks of “what the philosophers call” formal and objective
reality (AT 9: 32). These notions are not as controversial as they once
seemed, for commentators have come to see that “formal reality” is
actual existence. “Objective reality,” by contrast, is the type of being
that an idea has in virtue of its representational content and so is
often referred to as “representational reality.” Descartes adopts this
distinction in order to direct the meditator’s attention toward the
representational character of ideas and away from their status as
modes of mind. Only then will she be able to see that the idea of
God is of something actually inﬁnite and thus requires a cause other
than the meditator. Considered merely as modes, all ideas are caused
by the mind itself, of which they are modes, but given their represen-
tational character, they might require external causes.31 Given his
empiricist tendencies, the meditator is likely to think that he caused
his idea of God and, indeed, all ideas not deriving from the senses. The
distinction between formal and objective reality thus plays a vital
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role in Descartes’ argumentative strategy, which is to show that the
meditator cannot be the cause of this one very unique idea.
Without question, the most controversial aspect of Descartes’ dis-
cussion in the Third Meditation is his appeal to two causal adequacy
principles that are put forth as variations on the ex nihilo principle.
Let us refer to the ﬁrst of these as the formal reality principle (FRP):
everything that existsmust have a cause for its existence with at least
as much formal reality. Let us refer to the second as the objective
reality principle (ORP): the objective reality of an idea must have a
cause with at least as much formal reality as the idea has objectively.
What is interesting about these principles for our purposes is the way
in which Descartes tries to persuade us of their truth. In some places,
he derives them from one version of the ex nihilo principle together
with the implicit assumption that reality is scaled.32 In other places,
however, he treats them as basic or primitive truths33 and, given the
meditator’s penchant for conceiving of things in sensory terms, tries
to persuade us of their intuitive force by appealing to empirical
examples. I shall focus on the latter.
Before discussing any of these examples, it is instructive to con-
sider Descartes’ famous comparison in the ThirdMeditation between
ideas and images or pictures: ideas are “as it were the images of
things” (tanquam rerum imagines) (AT 7: 37). This is important
because only a few pages later he attempts to motivate the ORP by
using the same analogy: “ideas are in me like <pictures, or> images
which can easily fall short of the perfection of the things from which
they are taken, but which cannot contain anything greater or more
perfect” (AT 7: 42). Pictures of course are perceived through the
senses, and it is in this general context that Descartes uses empirical
analogies, such as the analogy of heat, to convince us of his two
additional causal principles.
Heat cannot be produced in an object whichwas not previously hot, except by
something of at least the same order <degree or kind> of perfection as heat . . .
But it is also true that the idea of heat . . . cannot exist in me unless it is put
there by some cause which contains at least as much reality as I conceive to
be in the heat. (AT 7: 41)34
The heat example is invoked here to motivate ﬁrst the FRP and then
the ORP. Although Descartes uses examples of this kind to help
meditators mired in the senses, doing so is not without risks. As
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noted in section 2.1, some of Descartes’ contemporaries took his
analogy between ideas and images too literally and concluded that
ideas are corporeal. Others, including some recent commentators,
have taken the analogy with heat as indicating a commitment to a
causal likeness or so-called “heirloom” principle, according to which
any property in the effect must be in the cause.35 The latter claim is
clearly belied by Descartes’ view that even as a purely thinking thing,
he could be the cause of his ideas of corporeal things such as shape and
motion.36 The two causal adequacy principles require only that the
cause have the proper degree of formal reality, not that it be like the
effect in any other respect. So why take these risks? Descartes may
have thought that such misunderstandings were unavoidable and, in
any case, that they were risks worth taking to help persuade a con-
fused meditator who might otherwise be unreachable.
Before closing this section, let us examine one last attempt to
motivate the ORP that often goes unnoticed, but which brings the
discussion in the Third Meditation full circle. Having attained cer-
tainty about his own existence in the Second Meditation, Descartes’
general aim in the Third is to determine whether anything outside of
him exists. He notes at the beginning of this text, just after intro-
ducing the threefold classiﬁcation of ideas, that in everyday life
the most common judgments we make about external objects are
formed on the basis of our sensory ideas. We judge that physical
objects cause these ideas and that the latter “resemble” them.
Descartes then argues that while such judgments seem to be taught
by nature, they are in fact based on “blind impulse” and therefore
should not be trusted (AT 7: 38–40). In at least two passages outside
the Meditations proper, however, he indicates that we can justify
such judgments based on the ORP. For example, in the Second
Replies he writes: “[The ORP] is the sole basis for all the beliefs we
have ever had about the existence of things located outside our mind.
For what could ever have led us to suspect that such things exist if not
the simple fact that ideas of these things reach our mind by means of
the senses?” (AT 7: 135, cf. AT 7: 165). Descartes’ primary aim in this
passage, however, is not to justify our everyday judgments of sense,
but to motivate the ORP itself. He is arguing that we ought to be
committed to this principle given how entrenched such judgments
are for us. Here again, he is appealing to ordinary sense experience to
motivate his causal principles. The fact that they can bemotivated in
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this way is likely one reason he employs them in the context of the
Meditations, given the epistemic status of the meditator.
the second causal argument
One of the controversies concerning Descartes’ causal arguments is
whether in fact there are two distinct arguments or whether the
second is merely an extension of, or a variation on, the ﬁrst. If
Descartes’ presentation in the Third Meditation is any indication,
there certainly seem to be two distinct proofs, the ﬁrst from the idea
of God and the second from the existence of the meditator qua
thinking thing. But in a letter to Mesland, he writes:
It does not make much difference whether my second proof . . . is regarded
as different from the ﬁrst proof, or merely as an explanation of it . . .
Nevertheless, it seems to me that all these proofs based on [God’s] effects
are reducible to a single one . . . (“To [Mesland], 2May 1644,” AT 4: 112)37
We can regard them as distinct arguments since there are differences
between them, but they are reducible to one in that they have the
same structure: they both depend on the ex nihilo principle and the
idea of God. In keeping with the latter, Descartes consistently
describes the second argument as an attempt to demonstrate God’s
existence “from the fact that we, who possess the idea of God, exist”
(Second Replies, AT 7:168).38 As we shall see below, the arguments
also deploy the same strategy, namely to show that the proposed
“effect” in each argument cannot be caused by the meditator.
Given the close relation between the two proofs, why does
Descartes ﬁnd it necessary to introduce a second one? In the First
Replies, he addresses this issue explicitly in the context of comparing
the idea of God to the idea of a highly intricate machine (another
sensory analogy). The point of the analogy is that the idea of God, as
rich in perfection as it is, requires a sufﬁcient cause asmuch as the idea
of a highly intricate machine. But he also draws our attention to an
important disanalogy between these two ideas: it is easier to grasp that
the idea of an intricatemachine requires an external cause because few
of us have the necessary expertise in mechanics to produce such an
idea ourselves. But “because the idea of God is implanted in the same
way in theminds of all, we do not notice it coming into ourminds from
any external source, and so we suppose it belongs to the nature of our
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own intellect” (First Replies, AT 7: 105–106). Descartes’ claim is that
since the idea of God is innate, everyone possesses it and is thus more
likely to take his own mind to be its source.39 Ironically, the very fact
that the idea of God is innate provides a reason for doubting that God
caused it!40 Descartes’ responds by arguing that even if this reason for
doubt proved to be justiﬁed, the mind that possesses the idea would
still require a cause that was actually inﬁnite.
Like the ﬁrst causal argument, the second can be formulated with-
out invoking any of the controversial causal principles that have
come to be associated with both arguments, as follows:
(1) I exist as a thinking thing that has an idea of an actually
inﬁnite being having all perfections.
(2) Everything that exists has a cause of its existence.
(3) The only possible cause ofmy existence is an actually inﬁnite
being having all perfections.
(4) Therefore, an actually inﬁnite being (i.e., God) exists.
The ﬁrst premise is just a statement of the cogito, combined with a
report on one of the meditator’s ideas. The second is the general
causal (ex nihilo) principle previously discussed. As with the ﬁrst
causal demonstration, the linchpin of the argument is the third prem-
ise. In this instance, Descartes employs three different sub-arguments
to persuade the reader of its truth. He varies these sub-arguments to
answer potential objections and to aid meditators who are having
trouble grasping the truth of premise (3). The general strategy of
each of them is to argue that if the meditator were self-caused then
he would be God. Self-causation sounds absurd, for when one says
that “x causes y” part of what one means ordinarily is that (a) x is
distinct from y and (b) x is prior to y. But a thing cannot be distinct
from, or prior to, itself.41 At the end of this section we shall discuss
howDescartes escapes these difﬁculties. He recognizes of course that
there are possible causes of his existence other than himself and
God. Indeed, in the Third Meditation he presents the second causal
proof as an argument from elimination and enumerates several pos-
sible causes – God, oneself, one’s parents, or “some other beings less
perfect than God” (AT 7: 48). However, Descartes focuses on elimi-
nating the possibility that he is self-caused for two reasons. First,
once the argument is complete, he can use this point to show that
unlike himself, God is self-caused in an important sense. Second, by
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eliminating the possibility that I am self-caused, I can summarily rule
out that I was caused by any being less perfect than God. This too is
similar to the procedure of the ﬁrst causal argument, where, as we
observed, Descartes argues that if I cannot cause my idea of God then
nor can any other ﬁnite being.
Given space constraints and in the interests of highlighting
the simplicity of Descartes’ causal arguments, I shall focus on the
ﬁrst of Descartes’ three sub-arguments for premise (3) and only
sketch the second. The ﬁrst might be called the “argument from
omnipotence”:
(i) If I had the power to cause my existence ex nihilo then I
would be omnipotent.
(ii) I am not omnipotent.
(iii) Therefore, I do not have the power to cause my existence ex
nihilo.
(iv) By parity of reasoning, no other ﬁnite being could cause me
either.
(v) Therefore, the only possible cause ofmyexistence is an actually
inﬁnite being having all perfections, including omnipotence.42
The crucial premise is clearly the ﬁrst, the point of which is that if
I caused my own existence then I would in effect be God. As for (ii),
Descartes asserts quite plausibly that he, as a ﬁnite thinking thing, is
imperfect in various ways. He knows, for example, that he lacks
omniscience from the fact that he doubts certain things. Similarly,
he knows that he lacks omnipotence from the fact that he desires
things that are beyond his grasp.43 Premise (iv) is an instance of the
argumentative strategy noted above that runs through all three sub-
proofs. Any ﬁnite being, in virtue of being ﬁnite, is going to lack
omnipotence. The ﬁnal conclusion in step (v) appeals implicitly to
one’s idea of God as a being having all perfections, including omni-
potence. This idea is mentioned in the ﬁrst premise of the main
argument. Here, one might complain that the conclusion is too
strong, given the premises, for what if my creator has omnipotence
but no other perfection? Descartes anticipates this type of objection
in the Third Meditation and replies by stressing that among all of the
attributes that we ﬁnd contained in the idea of God, unity or sim-
plicity “is one of the most important” (AT 7: 50). So a being that has
one perfection has them all.
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In the First Replies, Descartes claims that the second causal argu-
ment bypasses a difﬁculty that besets scholastic versions of the cos-
mological argument: why not suppose that the meditator, rather
than being created by God, is part of a chain of ﬁnite causes that
extends back inﬁnitely? The scholastics often responded that an
inﬁnite regress is inconceivable and therefore impossible.44 They
then posited God as the “First Cause” – i.e., the uncaused cause or,
in Aristotle’s memorable phrase, the unmoved mover. Descartes
agrees that a regress is “beyond my grasp,” but he does not think it
follows from this limitation of his intellect that a regress is impos-
sible (Second Replies, AT 7: 106). On the contrary, some regresses
actually occur: e.g., matter is divided indeﬁnitely and the universe is
indeﬁnitely extended. So, on his view, the regress objection is fatal to
traditional versions of the cosmological argument. The scholastics
have no way of ruling out the possibility that the universe is the
product of an inﬁnite series of ﬁnite causes, and positing God as the
First Cause begs the question. Descartes develops a second sub-
argument to show how his version of the second causal argument
bypasses this objection. Descartes argues that the meditator’s dura-
tion can be divided into moments that do not depend on one another
and, given this, he depends for his existence on something other
than himself at every moment.45 There can be no question of
whether he, at thismoment, might be the product of an inﬁnite series
of ﬁnite causes; God must be the immediate and total cause of his
preservation.46
Although Descartes seems to be right about this advantage of his
argument, he still must confront the question of what causes God,
given the universal character of the causal principle. Part of the force
of his criticism of the scholastics is that positing God as the First
Cause is inconsistent with that principle. So how does Descartes
avoid violating the causal principle himself? Here, rather infamously,
he declares that God is causa sui, but the notion of self-causation is
thought to be incoherent for the reasons given earlier.47 Arnauld
takes him to task for this assertion and, as a way of being helpful,
both he and Caterus propose that it be understood negatively: God
has no cause.48 But Descartes rejects this proposal, insisting that it be
understood positively and that God is the cause of himself in a sense
analogous to an efﬁcient cause.49 Despite appearances, Descartes’
position is a coherent one, as the following considerations will
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indicate. In an effort to clarify his view, Descartes tells Arnauld that
strictly speaking God is only the formal cause of his own existence,
where the term “formal” refers to the divine essence. Thismeans that
God’s essence is the “cause or reason” (causa sive ratio) why he needs
no efﬁcient cause. Still, God is causa sui in a positive sense given his
“inexhaustible power” or omnipotence (Fourth Replies, AT 7: 236).
Descartes does not mean to suggest that he bootstraps himself into
existence by sheer power. The point is rather that, given his omnip-
otence and ontological independence, God is the reason for his own
existence.
In fact, a better way of characterizing what Descartes sees himself
as doing is to say that he is employing a version of the principle of
sufﬁcient reason (PSR). As the quotation above suggests (“cause or
reason”), he conceives of the causal principle as a version of the PSR.
He is even more explicit in the Geometrical Exposition, appended to
the Second Replies:
Concerning every existing thing it is possible to ask what is the cause of its
existence. This question may even be asked concerning God, not because he
needs any cause in order to exist, but because the immensity of his nature is
the cause or reason [causa sive ratio] why he needs no cause . . . (AT 7: 164–65,
emphasis added)
Descartes’ use of the PSR in this context is typically overlooked50
because he does not employ it anywhere else and because it is
thought that unlike Leibniz and Spinoza, who make regular use of
the PSR, Descartes must reject it given his commitment to divine
voluntarism. Since absolutely everything depends on the divine will,
there are no reasons for things apart from that will.51 But while that
doctrine may constrain Descartes’ use of the PSR, it does not bar him
from using it in this one case, since it is God’s essence (not his will)
that provides the sufﬁcient reason for his existence.
conclus ion
The primary aim of this paper has been to illustrate that Descartes’
causal arguments for God’s existence have been criticized, and even
dismissed out of hand, unfairly. At their core, the arguments are
simple, elegant, and relatively plausible, especially as compared to
medieval versions. They are designed to mark an advance over the
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latter, ﬁrst, by delivering on the nature of God and, second, by show-
ing how one can vindicate the universal character of the causal
principle even in the case of God. Descartes’ arguments have not
received the respect they deserve, I have argued, because readers
have not understood his reasons for formulating them using scholas-
tic and Platonic doctrines, nor have they appreciated the ways in
which he adapts these doctrines for his own purposes. Descartes
saw himself as writing for an audience steeped in these traditions
and also one that was mired in the senses and so casts his arguments
in a way that will exploit the reader’s prejudices.52
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